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Abstract
Accident investigations indicate that the majority of ship accidents are in one way or another caused by human error. The 
underlying causes are manifold, and include aspects related to difficult working environments, inadequate crew competence, and
the lack of crew-centered design of equipment, working spaces and/or human machine interfaces.
This paper presents some of the results from the EU funded research project CyClaDes (Crew-centred Design and Operations of 
Ships and Ship Systems). This 3-year project involved a multi-disciplinary team of 14 partners from equipment suppliers, 
research institutes and classification societies and was concluded in September 2015. The project addressed pressing issues in the 
shipping industry regarding the need for improvements to the current lack of implementation of crew-centered design principles 
in the design of ship workspaces and equipment. Specifically, the team worked on six technical work packages with a focus on 
all the key steps in the ship systems/equipment design and operation lifecycle, the stakeholders, where the barriers to human
element integration into system/equipment design and operation occur; and how to best locate, produce, disseminate, and apply 
human element knowledge within the overall context of shipping. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Challenging work environments on board and the concept of human error
Living and working on board ships is challenging; the work environment is harsh (e.g. distractions from noise, 
vibration, changing environmental and climatic conditions) and the workload is high (e.g. due to shift-work,
physically demanding tasks, tight schedules, cost pressure, strongly perceived responsibility for safety of crew, 
ship and cargo). The crew is separated from families and friends for months and the spectrum of recreation and 
entertainment is limited (Marineinsight, 2012; Rengamani & Murugan, 2012). Communication between the 
crewmembers is often hampered by different mother tongues and poor knowledge of English amongst multinational 
crews (Hetherington et al., 2006; Berg et al., 2013). Additionally, advancements in information technology and 
increased automation in the control rooms and on the bridge have extended the tasks of the crew from traditional 
seamanship towards the operation of complex computerized systems (Ziarati, 2007). Further, the increased amount 
of paperwork is a time consuming factor that distracts the crew from their classical tasks (Alert, 2004). The 
accumulation of these factors can lead to high stress levels and increase the risk for errors. 
Indeed, accident investigations show that the majority of ship accidents in one way or another are caused by 
human error (Corovic & Djurovic, 2012; Baker & McCafferty, 2005). Human error can be the result of the complex 
interaction between many psychological factors (e.g. mental state, cognitive abilities), working environment factors 
(e.g. equipment design, work load), and external factors (e.g. congested waters, navigational challenges). These 
factors have the potential to influence a navigator’s performance both in a negative (i.e. inhibiting the navigator 
from performing his/her task safely, effectively and efficiently) and positive (i.e. creating a supportive environment 
that stimulates optimal performance) way. What is most notable is that there exists not one single type of human 
error; human error rather depends on many psychological processes, which in turn are influenced by many 
situational factors (Reason, 1990).
1.1. Poor design as an underlying cause of human error
Although it is tempting to attribute accidents to human error, much research has illustrated how human error 
should be considered a symptom of a work system that fails to support human performance (e.g. Reason, 1990). For 
example, results from several incident and accident analyses confirm that a significant number of accidents and 
incidents have been associated with errors in the human-machine interface (Kataria et al., 2014; DNV GL & 
Kystverket, 2015). The following marine accidents are selected as examples for illustrating how poor design of 
a work system became an underlying cause for human error:
a) Grounding of the „Royal Majesty”, 1995
The GPS of the passenger ship “Royal Majesty” lost the satellite signals due to a damaged antenna cable. The 
GPS defaulted into the Dead Reckoning (DR) mode. In this mode the position of the ship is not calculated 
but estimated. The GPS sounded a brief alarm and displayed two very small codes (“SOL” and “DR”) on its 
screen to indicate the change of mode. Neither the alarm nor the codes were noted respectively were correctly 
interpreted by the bridge team. The crew relied on the position displayed by the GPS and the ship grounded 
more than 15 nautical miles away from the intended route. Nobody was injured but the repair of the structural 
damage was about $2 million. 
The accident report (NTSB, 1997) concluded:  “The size of characters, the viewing distance, and the use of 
contrasting colors are a few of the factors that should be considered in designing character displays for 
alerts and warnings. Alert messages and status indicators about critical information, such as the GPS 
defaulting to the DR mode, should be distinctively displayed. In this case, the SOL and DR alert messages 
were much smaller than the normal status information”.
b) High-speed Ferry “Seastreak Wall Street” Accident in New York, 2013
On approach for docking, the ferry captain intended to reduce speed and transfer control from the center 
bridge control station to the starboard station for better visibility. The vessel did not respond as expected 
because, earlier, the captain had taken the vessel from the normal Combinator mode to the seldom-used
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Backup mode and he forgot to transfer the system back to Combinator mode. In Backup Mode, the propellers 
remained in the forward pitch position, causing the vessel to increase forward speed rather than slow down. 
Consequently the ferry collided with the pier at high speed, four passengers were seriously injured, and 76 
people sustained minor injuries. 
The accident report published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2014) found that the 
design of the control panel was one cause that contributed to the accident: the available indications of mode 
and control transfer were ambiguous. The mode is selected via push buttons that are arranged in an array of 
many other push buttons which are identical in shape, color and lettering. The selected mode is indicated via 
a small red LED in the upper left corner of each push button. 
The accident report concludes: In a stressful situation, looking at the control panel would require diverting 
attention from other critical tasks such as handling controls for an approach to the pier. Multiple LEDs 
would likely be illuminated. For example, in Combinator mode, the LEDs for 3 of the 11 pushbuttons would 
have been illuminated on each side. LEDs of identical color, luminosity, and size associated with identical 
buttons could confuse the operator. The design of these control panels could be improved to more readily 
display operating mode, applied pitch, and whether the control station was in command.
c) Dublin Viking mooring accident, 2007
During the departure from berth the operator of the stern line heaved in the line instead of paying out slack. 
The line parted and snapped back. The second officer was hit and fatally injured. The design of the winch 
control panel was one cause of the accident: the controls had to be operated in a counterintuitive way (i.e. 
pushing the lever away made the winch heave in). The operator had operated the winch before and knew that 
it was working in the opposite sense. However, during the maneuver he tried to control two winches (the 
mooring winch and the winch heaving up the stern ramp) at the same time and forgot about the peculiar 
characteristics of the mooring winch controls. 
In the accident report (MAIB, 2008), two design-related shortcomings are explained:
1. Markings to indicate the direction of rotation of the stern line winch were ambiguous, difficult to see 
from the normal operating position and provided no indication that the winch operated in the opposite 
sense.
2. The arrangement of vehicle decks and ramps made the aft mooring deck extremely crammed. This, 
combined with the number and arrangement of mooring lines created several overlapping snap-back 
zones if any of the lines were to part. The operator had to move in and out of these dangerous zones 
because he relayed orders to line-handlers and had to at the same time maintain visual contact with 
his own crew.
In the first two accidents described above, the systems were in other modes than the crew had expected. The 
current modes of the systems were not indicated in a way that caught the eye of the particular crew member. The 
third example shows how deck arrangements did not take into account the operational needs of the crew. This 
resulted in dangerous working routines where the operator compromised safety to be able to perform his task.
What can be concluded from these and many more examples is that crew safety and degree to which they can 
perform effectively and efficiently, depends on how supportive the design of their physical and cognitive workspace 
is. In other words, crew-centred design (CCD) of equipment and work spaces is one important way that the industry 
can help its crew to fulfil the multiple challenging tasks that are inherent to their daily work on board in an as safe, 
effective and efficient way as possible. This paper explains how findings from the CyClaDes project can be used to 
motivate the industry to follow principles of crew-centred design in ship design.
2. The CyClaDes Project
CyClaDes (“Crew-centred Design and Operations of Ships and Ship Systems”) is an EU-funded project that ran 
from October 2012 to September 2015. The project was designed to promote the increased impact of the human 
element in shipping across the design and operational lifecycle. The project brought together a multi-disciplinary 
team of equipment suppliers, research institutes and classification societies that worked on six technical work 
packages with a focus on:
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a) all the key steps in the ship systems/equipment design and operation lifecycle; 
b) the stakeholders; 
c) where the barriers to human element integration into system/equipment design and operation occur; and 
d) how to best locate, produce, disseminate, and apply human element knowledge within the overall context 
of shipping. 
What makes the project unique is that it supports the integration of the human element throughout each step of 
the design and operational life-cycle: from understanding the role of the human element in design, to creating 
a concept, to design, to application, to evaluation and approval, to maintenance of the equipment/system. In this way 
the project could directly address pressing needs identified in the shipping industry, and improve the current lack of 
implementation of crew-centered design (CCD) principles in workspace and equipment design. 
In the CyClaDes project, CCD is understood to be an approach to system/equipment design that takes the 
perspective of the user (crew) to make the equipment more usable for them, taking into account the specific 
requirements of the crew (e.g. anthropometrics, language skills, competencies) the working environment on-board 
ships (e.g. layout, climate, swell) and the context of use (e.g. mooring operations, berthing). CCD highlights the 
design for the end user on a ship, yet the concept stems from the human-centred design approach (HCD) as detailed 
out in the ISO 9241 series.
3. Deliverables and Results of the Project
The results of the CyClaDes project are presented in terms of two phases: the first phase covered the 
establishment of a novel accident database while the second phase focused on making information regarding CCD 
more accessible to stakeholders.
3.1. Phase 1: analyzing the causes of maritime incidents and accidents
In the first phase of the project, a novel accident database was developed. The database is populated with publicly 
available accident reports and incidents dating back to 2008. In total, 650 incidents and accidents are currently 
available in the database and around 900 ‘task errors’ have been coded using the TRACEr (Technique for the 
Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Error) taxonomy (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002). TRACEr focusses 
on the operator-machine interaction and suggests that incidents are often triggered by cognitive and psychological 
error by the operator. The taxonomy can be divided into those that describe the context of the incident, those that 
describe the cognitive background of the production of an error and those relating to the recovery of the incident 
(Kataria et al., 2014). The CyClaDes project adapted this technique from the aviation industry to the maritime 
domain. The results of this analysis show that 67% of the analyzed accidents involved issues with the human-
machine interface. Analyses of official accident investigation reports are often masked by the analysts’ subjective 
perspective. This influences the way causes are attributed to a particular accident. In CyClaDes interviews with 
seafarers were conducted in the project to mediate these effects. The interview results show that seafarers could 
easily identify several pieces of equipment where adapting CCD principles could lead to significant improvements 
to safety. Some examples of equipment that would be eligible for improved design are mooring winches, purifiers 
and ballast water pumps. Extremely alarming is the statement of one interviewee who talked about three fatalities in 
his company during maintenance operations of purifiers: in all three cases engineers had overlooked to put the 
locking knot in place prior to starting the purifier. The purifier started without the locking knot and the engineers 
were killed by the blades that came flying towards them at ten thousand rpm. This is just one example of how poor 
design can threaten safe, effective and efficient operations. 
Several test cases were selected for further investigation on the basis of the findings from the accident and 
incident analyses. One case is a study on crewmembers’ alertness and fatigue using eye-tracking techniques and 
capacitive movement sensors applied to the seat and the floor of a bridge simulator (Fig. 1). The findings show that 
it is possible to use physical measures such as eye-tracking and movement sensors to predict operator vigilance 
(Steinhage, 2015; Di Nocera et al., 2014). These are interesting measures that can ultimately be coupled with 
subjective vigilance measures such as subjective workload analyses to gain a better understanding of how operators 
can best be supported in particular situations and operations. 
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1 (a) Capacitive movement sensors applied to the seat and the floor of a bridge simulator (b) eyetracking.
Another task related to this phase of the project investigated the role of the human element in the context of 
quantitative risk analyses. For collision accidents, a model with two interacting segments, a dynamic and a static 
one, was developed. The dynamic part of the model was developed with the use of the Bayesian Networks (BN) 
with integrated elements from TRACEr. Its focus is on the calculation of the collision accident probability. This 
probability is inserted into the static part which allows the calculation of human, economic and environmental risk 
involved in collision accidents. These models allow for a better understanding of the role of the human element in 
a complete risk picture: aside from retrospective analyses based on incident and accident investigations, these 
models provide a proactive means to predict the risk for incidents and accidents based on the likelihood for human 
error (Sotiralis at al., 2014). 
Taken together, the activities performed in the first phase of the project provide supporting evidence for how 
essential it is to take the requirements and needs of the end user into account. Neglecting crew-centred design 
principles in design can increase the likelihood for human error and the risk for incidents and possibly fatal 
accidents.
3.2. Phase 2: Improving the availability of information concerning CCD principles 
One of the very important findings of the first part of the project is that, although much knowledge and 
experience about crew-centred design (CCD) in the maritime context is publically available, this information is not 
widely used by or known to designers and/or ship and equipment buyers. 
Discussions with stakeholders as well as extensive literature reviews confirm that the concepts for human 
element integration exist in the industry. However, the challenge is to develop, apply, and evaluate these concepts in 
a way that produces tangible results for multiple key stakeholders involved in the design and operation of a variety 
of shipboard areas and processes. 
To address this need, the CyClaDes project introduced a user-centered perspective for key stakeholders 
(i.e., designers, operators, authorities, end-users) in a framework that allows different stakeholders from the 
maritime industry to access design objectives, rules, guidelines, examples and links.
The CyClaDes framework
The CyClaDes framework is a web-based database that aims to make the existing information (i.e., guidelines, 
tools and methodologies) regarding CCD more accessible to those who are designing and ordering equipment and 
ship workspaces (http://framework.cyclades-project.eu/CyClaDes-Framework/). It supports the hypothesis that 
better access to information regarding CCD will improve the design of workspaces on board and thereby reduce the 
likelihood for human error and simultaneously improve work efficiency, work effectiveness and crew satisfaction 
(ISO 9241-11).  
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The framework is organized according to a ship-yard contracting structure (Loer et al., 2014). This structure 
covers the universal costing organization and breaks down into contractible design pieces (Fig. 2). It also allows for 
best practice guidance for CCD and examples to be provided at an assignable and recognizable design-piece level. 
Users are encouraged to browse the components of the framework to access relevant information related to the 
crew-centred design of such a component. In addition, the framework includes sections on Ships and People (how 
CCD is applicable in practice), guidance on Doing CCD (with links to the CyClaDes e-learning platform described 
below), Literature and Links (for additional information that goes beyond the scope of the framework), and 
a Glossary (explaining the terms used in the framework). The framework is a live document, intended to be created 
and maintained by and for the stakeholders after the completion of the CyClaDes project.
Fig. 2. The 8 modules of the CyClaDes framework.
The framework was developed according to user-centred design principles in how it involved a multi-disciplinary 
project consortium in addition to involving the expertise of stakeholders in two public workshops. In addition, three 
test cases were used to exemplify how the framework could be used in practice (Fig. 3). The test cases focused on: 
x The conning display
x The mooring winch control panel
x The Engine Room (escape routes, rescue, transport)
Fig 3. Criteria in the framework that can be used to inform designers about the mooring decks and control panels.
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Through following the principles of CCD and the information that was available in the framework, these test 
cases resulted in crew-centred designs for these particular pieces of equipment. For instance for a winch control 
panel, the activities as shown in Table 1 were conducted. The framework supports most of the activities by 
providing different type of information as indicated in the table. 
Table 1. Short description of the CCD process of a mooring winch control panel.
Activity Short description and support by framework
1 Familiarization with mooring 
equipment and procedures  
Get knowledge on typical equipment used and sequence of a typical mooring operation during 
mooring at quay. Framework provides relevant videos.
2 Analysis of mooring accidents Determination of human factor role, frequency and kind of injuries, contributing factors from the 
equipment design and arrangement side (using accident databases, MAIB, BSU etc.).
3 Review of existing rules, 
regulations and guidance
Looking for CCD guidance for mooring equipment and for maritime open deck equipment in 
general. Framework provides relevant references to IMO, Class Societies and other maritime 
association’s regulations, rules and guidance.
4 Users and environment Points of attention for users are different levels of experience, physical conditions (e.g. body 
dimensions and physical strength), sometimes difficult communication and reduced concentration 
due to fatigue. Framework provides information on typical working conditions on deck in harsh 
maritime environment.
5 Task analysis Identification of operator tasks: e.g. hierarchical tasks analysis of the main tasks carried out by a 
typical mooring team. Framework and e-learning modules provide good information basis.
6 Analysing existing design Identification of shortcomings leading to human errors by interviewing operators of the equipment, 
field work observation, identification of equipment arrangement drawback (i.e. snap back zones). 
Framework provides good and bad design practices. 
7 Proposal and evaluation of the 
new design
The proposal and evaluation process includes but is not limited to feedback from ship crew (users), 
comments from a reputable manufacturer and check of compliance with CCD guidelines.
The figure below (Fig. 4) illustrates how an original fixed mooring winch control panel design (a) was changed to 
a new design (b) supported by utilizing information provided by the framework. The main advantages of the new 
design are location of the emergency stop button (for easier access, improved identification and better protection 
against unintended activation), use of different sizes for the indicators (for better identification and perception) with 
clear and readable labelling as well as better location of the control switch. In addition, all controls and display 
elements are now accessible from any position of the operator.
(a) (b)
Fig 4 (a) Example of an existing winch control panel (b) new design for a fixed mooring winch control panel based on the principles of CCD.
The framework is the main deliverable of the project in terms of making information regarding CCD available to 
all stakeholders. This ambitious aim is supported by the other CyClaDes tasks that intended to communicate human 
element knowledge to stakeholders in the maritime domain:
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E-learning modules
Lectures have been developed and are provided via an e-learning platform (www.elearning.cyclades-project.eu). The e-
learning platform contains five dedicated learning packages for the stakeholder groups involved in the design and 
operation of vessels: end-users, ship-owners, naval architects, rule makers and authorities (Fig. 5). The modules 
enable the different parties to make use of the tools developed in the project in the most efficient way that increases 
maritime safety. The modules consist of common elements to be used in all training and awareness raising 
measures, as well as elements of particular need for the specific stakeholders, in order for all parties to understand 
their roles in the design and operation of ships and its equipment and systems.
Fig. 5. The 5 e-learning packages for the stakeholder groups involved in the design and operation of vessels.
The training material aims to provide help to the various stakeholders in the form of tools, means and measures to 
be applied to the design of ships, technology and procedures, and help to evaluate products and processes with 
regards to their crew-centeredness. In addition to tools, means and measure, the training materials also provide an 
introduction to concepts such as resilience, risk and safety and their importance for the overall safety of operation 
aboard. Much of the material is therefore based on findings from other CyClaDes previous work packages.
Improving Ship Operational Design, a new book published by the Nautical Institute
Many of the chapters of the newest edition of the Nautical Institute (NI) Book “Improving Ship Operational 
Design” (2015) are the result of findings from the CyClaDes Project.  One important finding from CyClaDes is that 
many designers do not have practical seafaring experience or direct access to seafarers. Therefore, the aim of the 
book is to introduce a crew-centered perspective to ship design and become a valuable source of information for 
both experienced designers and students. The chapters in the book cover:
x Introduction to human-centred design for naval architects and designers
x What the ship designer needs from mariners and shipowners
x The maritime domain (context of use)
x Operational requirements of the Captain/OOW
x Operational requirements for pilots and Tugmasters
x Operational requirements in the engine room and the engine control room
x Operational requirements of the chief officer in terms of cargo operations
x Living requirements for onboard personnel
x The needs of the shipowner
x Role and operations of HCD assessors
Together, these chapters should help the designer to interpret seafarer’s needs and understand the environments 
in which their products will be employed and subsequently translate them into their designs. It should also raise the 
awareness that proper design depends on the involvement of practitioners, i.e. sea-farers.
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4. Summary and conclusions
This paper explains the need for the crew-centered design of ships and ship systems to support safe, efficient and 
effective crew performance. In accordance with a system perspective to safety, human error should be seen as a 
symptom of a working system that inadequately supports human performance. From this it follows that all 
stakeholders involved in the design of ships and ship systems bear the responsibility for taking the end user into 
account so as to minimize the likelihood for human error and optimize on board operations.
The EU-funded CyClaDes project ran from 2012 to 2015 with the aim of contributing with information to 
support stakeholders in implementing CCD principles to ship and ship system design. A multi-disciplinary team of 
experts worked together with stakeholders to illustrate how the quality of design influences operator performance. 
This lays the foundation for a web-based framework that was developed in the project to provide the industry with 
easier access to information regarding the principles for CCD and practical crew-centered design recommendations.
The findings from each of the work packages in CyClaDes have been positively received by the industry. The 
accident database, for example, is a significant improvement to existing databases in that it makes use of 
a standardized method to categorize the causes underlying the incidents and accidents. The framework is particularly 
unique in that it offers a user-friendly centralized platform for accessing important design information which is in 
accordance to CCD principles. Therefore, although the CyClaDes project is now concluded, the framework should 
be used and maintained actively by the industry. 
At the time of writing, it remains undecided who or what institution will be in charge of quality checking the 
information that stakeholders contribute to the framework. A networking service is envisioned that can facilitate the 
process of establishing inter-disciplinary contact, exchanging knowledge between stakeholders, and eventually 
forming multidisciplinary design teams. This network can also be made responsible for maintaining the quality of 
the framework so that it is kept alive and referenced beyond the Cyclades project. The industry must continue to 
work towards making the principles for CCD easily accessible to stakeholders. As explained in this paper, the 
CyClaDes consortium has shown that including CCD as early as possible in the design process is crucial for 
reducing the likelihood for human error, minimizing the risk for accidents and improving crew performance. It is 
hoped that this will help to motivate stakeholders to implement CCD in their designs and take their responsibility to 
contribute to safer, more efficient and effective ship operations. 
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